Melvin Goodman

For the past few decades, the Washington Post's David Ignatius has been an apologist for the Pentagon’s use of force, the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of covert action, and Israel’s aggressive use of military power to secure its sovereignty. Once again, the United States is faced with a difficult geopolitical challenge of its own making, and once again—like Ignatius—politicians and pundits argue it will simply take more military power for the United States to achieve its misbegotten objectives.

The U.S.-Israeli invasion of Israel was planned as a short war, but it is turning into an unmitigated, gale-force cock-up. Fighting continues in the sixth month and as many as 17 nations may be involved. Iran launched attacks on U.S. military facilities in Kuwait last week, and an Egyptian port near the Suez Canal was hit as well. Two ships were hit, including a U.S. gas storage tanker. These attacks threaten Saudi Arabia’s use of the Red Sea, needed to gain access to the canal. This was necessitated by the Houthis attacks to close down the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb that connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

Most American interpretations of our history have been triumphal. From the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 to the justifications for war with Iran in 2026, politicians and pundits have largely accepted the triumphal nature of the use of force and denied the criticism that accompanied these actions. Interpretations of the past and present have been a battleground at the heart of American politics. Revisionists and critics have been for the most part on the outside looking in.

Last Friday, the Central Intelligence Agency released 69 presidential intelligence reports that contained no major new revelations and underplayed the intelligence failure that permitted the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The New York Times contributed to the underestimation by ignoring analytical failures that can be documented. As I have written in the past, the CIA’s intelligence collection was good enough to prevent the 9/11 attacks, but CIA leadership and its intelligence analysis were severely lacking. Any attack on the United States that takes place without strategic warning is by definition an intelligence failure.

History rarely provides opportunities for lessons learned, but the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 intelligence failure could have provided an opportunity to determine some accountability for the failure and methods to improve the performance of intelligence analysis. Thus far, it appears that politicians, pundits, and the mainstream media are not interested in lessons learned or exploring the nexus between history and policy.

Arms control and disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union served the international interests of both as well as the entire global community. These interests included the placement of limits on the number of nuclear weapons (Strategic Arms Control Talks); limits on defensive systems that allowed the reduction of offensive weapons (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty); limits on the proliferation of nuclear powers (Non-proliferation Treaty); the destruction of an entire class of nuclear weapons (Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement); the creation of confidence-building measures; and even the initiation of detente between Washington and Moscow.

Narcissism: Marked by grandiosity, pride, arrogance, and a constant need for attention and admiration. Psychopathy: Characterized by high impulsivity,

There is no greater myth regarding American exceptionalism than the view that only the United States has always seen the promotion of “liberal democracy” as part of its national identity. In actual fact, the United States pledges itself to “liberal democracy” the world over only when its military designs are compromised or stymied. The model was President Woodrow Wilson’s “war to end all wars” during World War I. When Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany in 1917, he famously stated that the “world must be made safe for democracy.”

In 1947, the U.S. Congress passed the National Security Act, which created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. These institutions were often misused during the worst days of the Cold War and, more recently, in the Global War on Terror. Nevertheless, there are historical records on the decision making that took place, and there were successes in such fields as arms control and disarmament as well as the building of national security alliances in Europe and Asia.

In 1947, the U.S. Congress passed the National Security Act, which created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. These institutions were often misused during the worst days of the Cold War and, more recently, in the Global War on Terror. Nevertheless, there are historical records on the decision making that took place, and there were successes in such fields as arms control and disarmament as well as the building of national security alliances in Europe and Asia.